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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
NOE RODRIGUEZ CARRENO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appellate Court #: 20030927-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(j). This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(4). The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court is based upon Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(i). This is an appeal from the 
Defendant's conviction for Attempted Aggravated Murder, a First Degree Felony, 
Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, Aggravated Kidnaping, a First Degree Felony, 
and Interrupting a Communication Device, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court's initial denial of the Defendant's Motion and Memorandum to 
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Appoint Investigator [Addendum 5] R. 31-34, and granting of the Defendant's renewal 
of Motion to Appoint Investigator [Addendum 7] R. 64-72, with a limitation on the 
expenditure which could made, interfere with and deny the Defendant independent 
and effective assistance of counsel? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review of the denial and limited granting of the 
Defendant's Motion to Appoint an Investigator is a mixed question of law and fact to 
be reviewed for correctness with deference to be given to the Trial Court's factual 
findings and no deference to the Trial Court's conclusions. 
Issue Preserved. The issue was preserved by the Petitioner's filing of Notice of 
Appeal. 
2. Did the Trial Court's Jury Instruction #30, [Addendum 8] R. 164, violate the 
Defendant's right not to testify? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review of the correctness of Jury Instruction 
#30 is a question of law with no deference to be given to the Trial Court's 
conclusions. 
Issue Preserved. The issue was not preserved. The Petitioner by filing of Notice of 
Appeal requests that the issue be considered to avoid manifest injustice. The 
instruction involves important constitutional rights, and effective assistance of counsel 
justifying consideration of the instruction to avoid "manifest injustice" to the 
Defendant. 
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3. Was the Trial Court's Jury Instruction #33, [Addendum 9] R. 167, improperly given 
with the other instructions, prior to any indication that the jury may be deadlocked? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review of the correctness of Jury Instruction 
#33 is a question of law with no deference to be given to the Trial Court's 
conclusions. 
Issue Preserved. Issue Preserved. The issue was not preserved. The Petitioner by 
filing of Notice of Appeal requests that the issue be considered to avoid manifest 
injustice. The instruction involves important constitutional rights, and effective 
assistance of counsel justifying consideration of the instruction to avoid "manifest 
injustice" to the Defendant. 
4. Did Counts I and II of the Information [Addendum 4] R. 1-3 properly distinguish 
between the two (2) separate charges of Attempted Aggravated Murder? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review of whether Counts I and II of the 
Information properly distinguished between the two (2) separate charges of Attempted 
Aggravated Murder is a question of law with no deference given to the Trial Court's 
conclusions. 
Issue Preserved. The issue was preserved by the Petitioner's filing of the Notice of 
Appeal. 
5. Was counsel's representation of the Defendant ineffective? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
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a mixed question of law, reviewed for correctness with no deference to the Trial 
Court's conclusions. 
Issue Preserved. The issue was preserved by the Petitioner's filing of the Notice of 
Appeal. 
III. STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS APPEAL 
Utah Code Annotated 77-32-301, [Addendum 1] 
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure [Addendum 2] 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I Section 12 [Addendum 3] 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. Nature and Course of Proceedings. The State of Utah commenced this case by 
filing a five (5) count Information [Addendum 4] R. 1 -3 o n December 4, 2000, 
charging the Defendant with: Count I, Attempted Aggravated Murder, a felony of the 
First Degree, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-5-202, 1953 As Amended; 
Count II, Attempted Aggravated Murder, a felony in the First Degree, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated 76-5-202,1953 As Amended; Count III, Aggravated Burglary, 
a felony in the First Degree, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-203, 1953 As 
Amended; Count IV, Aggravated Kidnaping, a felony in the First Degree, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated 76-5-302, 1953 As Amended; and Count V, Interrupting a 
Communication Device, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
76-6-108, 1953 As Amended. 
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The Defendant filed a Declaration of Indigeny, R.12-13, and a Public Defender was 
appointed to represent him. Preliminary hearing was held on December 14,2000 and 
the Court found probable cause to hold the Defendant to answer the charges in the 
Information. The Defendant was arraigned and a jury trial was set for February 6, 7, 
& 8,2001. After various pre-trial proceedings a jury trial was held on April 17,2001. 
The jury convicted the Defendant on Count I, Attempted Aggravated Murder; 
acquitted the Defendant on Count II, Attempted Aggravated Murder; convicted the 
Defendant on Count III, Aggravated Burglary, Count IV, Aggravated Kidnaping, and 
Count V, Interruption of a Communication Device. The Defendant appeared for 
sentencing on May 22, 2001 and the trial Court sentenced the Defendant and entered 
its Judgment and Commitment, R. 181-182, committing the Defendant to the Utah 
State Prison. 
After counsel failed to file a notice of appeal, the Defendant brought a Motion for 
Extraordinary Relief and pursuant to the Defendant's Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief the Court entered an Amended CriminalJudgment and Order of Commitment 
on November 5, 2003, R.327-328. 
The Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed on November 19, 2003, R.329-330. 
2. Statement of Relevant Facts. The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows: 
A. The Defendant was accused of breaking into his wife's apartment in 
Tremonton, Utah on or about November 26, 2000 in the middle of the night, 
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T. 49-50. The Defendant's wife, Kristy Lamb, was in the apartment along with 
two men, Lee Duong and Able Carrazo. When the Defendant entered the 
apartment he possessed a gun. The Defendant's wife, upon his entry, 
immediately attempted to call 911 and the Defendant pulled the phone cord out 
of the wall. A struggle ensued with the Defendant's wife trying to wrestle the 
gun away from the Defendant and Mr. Duong immediately jumping up and 
hitting the Defendant in the face. During the struggle, while the wife was 
trying to wrestle the gun away from the Defendant, the gun discharged hitting 
Mr. Duong, T. 79-81. After the gun fired Mr. Duong ran out of the apartment; 
the Defendant tried to pull his wife outside and then chased Mr. Duong. The 
witnesses said that they heard another shot while the Defendant was chasing 
Mr. Duong, however, no one saw the Defendant fire the gun outside of the 
apartment during the chase and no shell casing or other physical evidence of 
the gun being fired was produced. There was no evidence that the gun was 
fired at Mr Duong or anyone else outside of the apartment. After Mr. Duong 
and the Defendant returned to the apartment, the Defendant then attempted to 
get his wife to go home with him to Snowville, Utah. 
B. On January 16,2001 the Defendant's counsel filed aMotion and Memorandum 
to Appoint Investigator [Addendum 5] R. 31-34 requesting that the Court 
authorize employment of a investigator to assist in investigating defenses, 
6 
particularly self-defense. The Court denied the motion by Memorandum 
Decision,[Addendum 6] R. 37-39 on January 23, 2001. The Defendant 
renewed and supplemented the motion, by filing his Exparte Supplement to 
Defendant's Motion Memorandum to Appoint Investigator [Addendum 7] R. 
64-72, on February 8, 2001. After the State's Attorney agreed to stipulate to 
appointment of an investigator, provided that not more than Five Hundred 
Dollars ($500.00) would be expended the Court granted the motion on March 
22, 2001, limiting any expenditures to not more than Five Hundred Dollars 
($500.00), R. 78-79. Trial of this case was held on April 17, 2001. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court's denial of the Defendant's January 16, 2001 motion to appoint an 
investigator to explore defenses was error. The activities and background of the 
victims in this case were certainly relevant to the charges against the Defendant. The 
Defendant's counsel was with question in the best position to determine the need for 
an independent investigator to determine whether there was exculpatory evidence. 
The Trial Court's denial of the Defendant's Motion and its refusal to grant a 
continuance of the February trial date violated the minimum standards for defense of 
an indigent, established by Utah Code Annotated 77-32-3 01, and the United States and 
Utah Constitutions. The Court's denial compromised the Defendant's right to, "timely 
representation by competent legal counsel", the right to be provided, "the investigatory 
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resources necessary for a complete defense", and the right to, "undivided loyalty of 
defense counsel". The Trial Court's eventual grant of the Defendant's Motion, while 
improperly restricting the amount of money which could be spent, came so near the 
trial date that it did not cure problems caused by the earlier denial. 
The Trial Court's Jury Instruction #30 [Addendum 8] R. 164, overemphasized and 
highlighted the Defendant's competency and the right to be a witness in his own 
behalf improperly emphasizing the Defendant's failure to testify. The Jury 
Instruction was a comment by the Court on the Defendant's failure to testify, in 
violation of the United States Constitution. The jury could naturally and necessarily 
construe the Court's emphasis on the Defendant's right to testify, as a comment on the 
basis of the Defendant's decision not to testify. If the jury concluded that the 
Defendant's decision not to testify did not fit any of the circumstances emphasized by 
the Court, the jury would be more inclined to consider the Defendant's lack of 
testimony and ignore the direction not to consider it. 
Trial Court's Jury Instruction #33 [Addendum 9] R. 167, improperly emphasizes the 
importance of majority opinions and the need to reach an opinion while de-
emphasizing individual judgments. The Instruction creates a real danger that the 
majority opinion would be the driving force in formulating the jury's consideration of 
the case, while individual opinions would not be considered. The Instruction is 
improper unless possibly there is some real indication that the jury may be deadlocked. 
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The Instruction should not have been given at the stage of the proceedings that it was 
given. 
4. Counts I and II of the Information failed to distinguish between the two separate 
charges of Attempted Aggravated Murder denying the defendant his constitutional 
right to know "the nature and cause of the accusation against him". The jury 
convicted on Count I and acquitted on Count II. It is not possible to determine the 
factual basis on which the jury convicted or on which the jury acquitted. Some of the 
jurors may have convicted on facts while others may have acquitted on the same facts. 
It was improper to charge the jury on both Counts of Attempted Aggravated Murder 
without insuring that the two Counts were distinguishable. 
5. The performance of the Defendant's Trial counsel was so deficient that defendant was 
denied effective assistance of counsel. The deficient performance prejudiced the 
Defendant's defense. Trial counsel failed to call certain witnesses to help explain the 
reason that the Defendant had a gun at the time he entered his wife's apartment. Trial 
counsel did not adequately pursue an investigation of defendant's case. The Court's 
actions, as referred to above, obstructed the Trial counsel's investigation of the 
defendant's case. Trial counsel failed to object to the erroneous and prejudicial 
Instructions, 30 and 33. These deficiencies deprived the Defendant of a fair Trial. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
1. Trial court's denial and limitation of Defendant's request for an investigator was 
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error. The Utah Legislature in recognition of the requirement of the Constitutions of 
the United States and State of Utah to provide effective assistance of counsel to 
indigent defendants enacted Utah Code Annotated 77-32-301, establishing minimum 
standards for defense of indigents. The standards require that a defendant be afforded 
(2), "timely representation by competent legal counsel", be provided (3), "the 
investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense" and (4), "assure undivided 
loyalty of defense counsel to the client". This Court has stated in State vs. Hancock, 
875 P2d 132; (Ut. App. 1994), "Trial courts must determine the circumstances under 
which an investigator is necessary for a complete defense, and trial courts have some 
discretion in that determination." However, the court in footnote 3 pointed out the 
limitations of the Trial Court's discretion as follows: 
"3. The trial court's determination of whether to appoint an investigator 
must always focus on the facts of the case and never on the expense of 
such an appointment to the state, county, or municipality. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-32-1(3) requires state prosecuting bodies to provide indigent 
defendants with investigators when necessary for their complete 
defense. Budgeting for such appointments is the responsibility of city 
councils, county commissions, and state legislatures. Trial courts need 
not worry about the expense of appointing an investigator; rather, trial 
courts should consider only the question of whether appointment of an 
investigator is necessary for a complete defense." 
The Trial Court in making its determination should be guided by the observations of 
Justice McClintock in his descent in Jackson vs. State, 624 P2d. 751; (Wy 1981). 
Justice McClintock observed in quoting Judge Wisdom of the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court 
in United States vs. Theriault 400 F2d. 713; (5th Cir. 1971), in deciding what 
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constitutes necessity, defense services should be authorized, "when the defense 
attorney makes a timely request in circumstances in which a reasonable attorney would 
engage such services for a client having independent financial means to pay for them." 
Further, "The trial judge should tend to rely on the judgment of the attorney, who has 
the primary duty of providing an adequate defense..." 
In this case the Trial Judge denied the Defendant's initial request which was filed by 
defense counsel thirty-two (32) days after the preliminary hearing, but eleven (11) 
days after motion deadline established by the court. The Court's Memorandum 
Decision [Addendum 6] R. 37-39, does not really address why a private investigator 
is not necessary, but tends to base his decision on counsel's failure to meet the, "court-
mandated deadline". After the February trial date was continued to April 17, 2001} 
Counsel renewed the Defendant' s request for assistance of an investigator on February 
8,2001, filing a more comprehensive Memorandum which detailed factual assertions, 
[Addendum 6] R. 64-77. The Court granted the renewed request a month-and-a-half 
later on March 22, 2001, limiting however, any expenditures to no more than Five 
Hundred Dollars ($500.00).2 The Court's grant of the Defendant's request which 
came only twenty-six (26) days before trial and severely limiting the amount that 
IThe trial date was continued because and interpreter failed to appear for the Final 
Pre-Trial on January 29, 2001, See Minute Entry. 
2Apparently the court's decision was driven by the State attorney's agreement to 
appoint, but only with a limitation of the amount to be expended. See Minute Entry of 
February 27, 2001. 
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could be expended failed to ensure that the Defendant was provided, "the 
investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense." Although it is not possible 
at this stage of the proceedings to know whether or not an independent investigator 
would have turned up exculpatory evidence, that knowledge is not determinative. As 
the Supreme Court of South Dakota stated in State vs. Sahlie. 245 N.W.2d 476,478-
479 (1976): 
" . . . Due process cannot be satisfied unless the defendant is provided 
some opportunity to examine possible exculpatory evidence long 
enough before trial so as to have at least an opportunity to determine if 
such evidence is or is not exculpatory." 
Effective assistance of counsel requires that intelligent pre-trial negotiations take 
place based on a thorough knowledge of the evidence, for and against the defendant. 
2. The Trial Court's Jury Instruction, # 30 was an impermissible comment on 
Defendant's failure to testify. The United States Supreme Court in Griffin v 
California. 380 US 609, 14 L ed 2d 106, 85 S Ct 1229, (1965), held that it was 
impermissible for the court, as well as the prosecuting attorney, to comment on the 
Defendant's failure to testify or that such failure is any evidence of guilt. Comment 
on the Defendant's failure to testify was held to violate the self-incrimination clause 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. There has been conflicting authority on 
the propriety, under Griffin, for the court to give an instruction that no inference 
should be drawn against the defendant because of his failure to testify, unless 
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requested by the defendant. 18 ALR3d, 1335; Propriety Under Griffin v California 
and Prejudicial Effect of Unrequested Instruction that no Inference Against Accused 
Should be Drawn from His Failure to Testify, (1968). The Arizona Court of Appeals 
acknowledged in State v Cousins, 420 P2d 185, 4 Ariz App 318, (1966), that it was 
error to give an unsolicited instruction on the defendant's right not to testify. The 
Arizona Court held in State v Laragosa. 430 P2d 426, 4 Ariz App 80, (1967), that it 
was reversible error to give the unsolicited instruction on the defendant's right not to 
testify. The explanation of the California Court of Appeals, Second District, in 
People v Molano. 61 Cal Rptr 821, 18 ALR3d, 1328, (1967), in holding that it was 
error to give such an instruction over the objection of the defendant is compelling. 
The court stated, the "instruction highlights and emphasizes the fact that the accused 
did not take the stand". The California court also found the following statement by 
Justice Douglas in his decent in United States v Gainey. 380 US 63, 13 L ed 2d 658, 
85 S Ct 754, (1965), compelling: 
"Just as it is improper for counsel to argue from the defendant's silence, 
so is it improper for the trial judge to call attention to the fact of the 
defendant's silence. . . . if the defendant sees fit, he may choose to have 
no mention made of his silence by anyone'' 
The Instruction given by the Trial Court in this case was not requested by the 
Defendant and had the likely effect of highlighting and emphasizing the Defendant's 
failure to take the stand. It also further undermined the Defendant's right not to 
testify by placing it in the context of the Defendant's reciprocating right to be a 
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witness on his own behalf. The Instruction also states a limited number of possible 
reasons that the defendant may choose not to testify. Without making it clear that 
there are numerous other reasons, having nothing to do with the state of the evidence, 
the jury could interpret the Instruction to mean that if any of the reasons stated in the 
Instruction did not apply to the defendant's case; the Defendant should have testified. 
Jury Instruction, # 33 was an impermissible emphasis on the importance of the 
majority over individual conclusions. The Instructions should not have been given 
before the jury's initial deliberations. If the Instruction is permissible at all, it should 
only be given when there are real indications of jury deadlock. The Instruction could 
well have the effect of stifling a timid juror from expressing his or her opinion in the 
face of previously expressed views of the majority of the other jurors. This could be 
particularly damaging during the initial discussions of the jury. The lone, timid 
juror's opinion may have merit and may be adopted by the other members of the jury 
if only if were discussed. Individual jurors may not have the self-confidence of 
others; such people may be disposed to consider themselves "a dissenting juror" and 
give up his initial impressions of the evidence, even if correct, without expressing 
them to the other members of the jury. 
Counts I and II of the Information failed to inform the Defendant of the nature 
and cause of the acquisition against him. Counts I and II of the Information used 
the exact same language to charge two (2) Counts of Attempted Aggravated Murder 
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without including any way to distinguish the particular acts constituting each separate 
offense. The Utah Supreme Court in State v Burnett. 712 P2d 260, (Utah 1985), 
points out that an Information used to initiate a criminal prosecution also serves the 
Constitutional function of informing the defendant of, "the nature and cause of the 
acquisition against him", as guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
Article I Section 12. The right, " . . . entitles the accused to be charged with a specific 
crime, so that he can know the particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can 
adequately prepare his defense." Because of the lack of specificity of the two (2) 
Counts, it is not possible to know the particular acts on which the jury based its 
conviction under Count I and the acts that the jury found did not justify a conviction 
under Count II. Did the jury acquit for the incident in the apartment where Mr. 
Duong was apparently shot because it was self-defense or accident? Did the jury 
convict on the incident in the apartment where a bullet passed through the clothing of 
the Defendant's wife, or the incident outside of the apartment when the Defendant 
was apparently chasing Mr. Duong? It is impossible to know because of the lack of 
specificity of the two (2) Counts in the Information. Part of the jurors may have 
convicted under Count I for the incident in the apartment while other jurors may have 
convicted based on the incident outside of the apartment. It was error for the Court 
to charge the jury on both Counts of Attempted Aggravated Murder without providing 
sufficient specificity so the jury could distinguish the particular wrongful acts 
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constituting the offense alleged in each Count. 
5. The Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel's 
failure to object to Juiy Instruction, #30, allowed the Defendant to be deprived of his 
valuable Constitutional right to not testify without comment by the Court. Failure to 
object to Jury Instruction, #33, compromised the Defendant's right to be convicted 
by each individual member of the jury, rather than the majority of the jurors. As well 
as the harm done at the trial, failure to object compromises the Defendant's right to 
appeal based on the objectionable Instructions; See Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Trial counsel's failure and the fact that the Instructions have very 
important Constitutional implications, justifies this Court to consider the Instructions 
as error to avoid "manifest injustice" to the Defendant. Trial counsel asserted in his 
Opening Argument, [Addendum 10] T. 57-59, and in his Closing Argument 
[Addendum 11 ] T. 199, Ln 1 through 200 Ln 6, that the reason the Defendant brought 
the gun to his wife's apartment was important. The reason stated was for "self-
defense, that he was frightened"; presumably the reason for him being frightened was 
because of the earlier encounter at his home in Snowville, Utah with his wife, Mr. 
Duong, and another man. The incident is related in paragraph D page 4 of the 
Defendant's ExParte Supplement to Defendant's Motion Memorandum to Appoint 
Investigator, [Addendum 7]. The incident was apparently investigated by Deputy 
Lewis of the Box Elder County Sheriffs Office and Trooper Willmore of the Utah 
16 
Highway Patrol, yet neither Deputy Lewis or Trooper Willmore were called as 
witnesses at the Trial. Their reports were not introduced to show the threat made 
against the Defendant with a knife. The Court's denial and limitation of the 
Defendant's use of an investigator contributed to, and caused, the failure to make a 
complete investigation of the basis for the Defendant's need to take a gun to his 
wife's apartment and the basis for him being frightened. Defendant's counsel may 
have contributed to the problem by his failure to meet the Court's initial motion 
deadlines. In any event, failure to timely allow an independent investigator to assist 
in the preparation of the Defendant's defense compromised the Defendant's right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel to assist in his defense. The 
Court prevented the Defendant from receiving a defense in compliance with the minimum 
standards for defense of an indigent defendant. The Court compromised the Defendant's 
Constitutional right to not testify. The Court's Jury Instructions, as argued above, were 
improper and contributed to the Defendant's failure to receive a fair trial. For these reasons 
the Defendant's conviction should be set aside and the case remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 2004. 
Jack H. Molgard J  . l  
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
102 South 100 West 
P.O. Box 461 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to: 
Matthew D. Bates 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S., 6th Floor 
PO Box 140854 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0854 
DATED this 12th day of July, 2004. 
Is) Jacj^ d Molqarri 
'Jack H. Molgard, <J 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM 1 
LexisiNexis^nvi; ^u x agss x KJI. j. 
77-32-301. Minimum standards for defense of an indigent. 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in criminal cases in the 
courts and various administrative bodies of the state in accordance with the following minimum 
standards: 
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of the deprivation of the 
indigent's liberty; 
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense; 
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; 
(5) proceed with aiirstappeal of right; and 
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by defense counsel to be in the 
interest of justice except for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary ^Vtit 
proceedings. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may instruct the jury concerning 
the jurors1 duties and conduct, the order of proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the alleged 
crime, and the definition of terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter stipulated to by 
the parties and agreed to by the court and any matter the court in its discretion believes will assist the 
jurors in comprehending the case. Preliminary instructions shall be in writing and a copy provided to 
each juror. At the final pretrial conference or at such other time as the court directs, a party may file a 
written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. The court shall 
inform the parties of its action upon a requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall 
furnish the parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. 
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law if the instruction will 
assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to giving the written instruction, the court shall advise 
the parties of its intent to do so and of the content of the instruction. A party may request an interim 
written instruction. 
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party may 
file written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time 
copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of its 
proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, 
unless the parties waive this requirement. Final instructions shall be in writing and at least one copy 
provided to the jury. The court shall provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its 
discretion, provide a copy to all jurors. 
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court shall endorse its decision 
and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the 
endorsement what part of the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are given to the jury. 
Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the 
jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not 
be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify 
the matter to which the objection is made and the ground of the objection. 
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court refers to any of the 
evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has given the jury its final 
instructions. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time for argument shall be within 
the discretion of the court. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
LexisNexis(TM) CD Pagel ofl 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify 
in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by 
statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any 
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined 
by statute or rule. 
ADDENDUM 4 
ROGER F. BARON #0225 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
45 NORTH 100 EAST 
BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH 84302 
(435) 734-9464 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, INFORMATION 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
NOE RODRIGUEZ CARRENO Case No.nQf iOQ^/XJ F$ 
830 N. STONE RD 
SNOWVILLE, UT Investigating Officer: 
DOB: 4-25-69 RANDY HIGLEY 
Defendant. | 
The undersigned, as prosecuting attorney, hereby charges the 
defendant(s) with committing, at Box Elder County, State of Utah, 
the crime(s) of: 
COUNT I 
ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER, A FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE, AT 
TREMONTON, BOX ELDER COUNTY, UTAH, ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 2 6, 
2000,IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 76-5-202, UCA, (1953, AS AMENDED), 
TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT 
INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY ATTEMPTED TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF DUONG 
LEE, USING A FIREARM, AND; 
1. THE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY CREATED A GREAT RISK OF 
DEATH TO A PERSON OTHER THAN THE VICTIM; OR, 
2. THE ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE OCCURRED WHILE THE 
DEFENDANT WAS COMMITTING, ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT OR IN-FLIGHT AFTER 
COMMITTING A BURGLARY OR AGGRAVATED BURGLARY OR KIDNAPING OR 
ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING. 
COUNT II 
ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER, A FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE, AT 
TREMONTON, BOX ELDER COUNTY, UTAH, ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 2 6, 
2000,IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 76-5-202, UCA, (1953, AS AMENDED), 
TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT 
INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY ATTEMPTED TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF DUONG 
LEE, USING A FIREARM, AND; 
1. THE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY CREATED A GREAT RISK OF DEATH TO 
A PERSON OTHER THAN THE VICTIM; OR, 
2. THE ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE OCCURRED WHILE THE DEFENDANT WAS 
COMMITTING, ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT OR IN-FLIGHT AFTER COMMITTING A 
BURGLARY OR AGGRAVATED BURGLARY OR KIDNAPING OR ATTEMPTED 
KIDNAPPING. 
COUNT III 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, A FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE, AT BOX ELDER 
COUNTY, ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 26, 2000, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 
76-6-203, UCA, (1953, AS AMENDED), TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT THE 
DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT, WHILE ATTEMPTING, COMMITTING , OR 
FLEEING FROM A BURGLARY; 
1. CAUSED BODILY INJURY TO ANOTHER PERSON NOT A PARTICIPANT 
IN THE BURGLARY; OR 
2. USED OR THREATENED THE IMMEDIATE USE OF A DANGEROUS 
WEAPON, TO WIT, A FIRE J(feARM, AGAINST ANY PERSON NOT A 
PARTICIPANT IN THE BURGLARY; OR 
3. POSSESSED A DANGEROUS WEAPON, TO WIT, A FIREARM. 
COUNT IV 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, A FELONY OF THE FIRST DEGREE, AT BOX ELDER 
COUNTY, ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 26, 2000, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 
76-5-302, UCA, (1953 AS AMENDED), TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT THE 
DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY, WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY OF LAW AND AGAINST THE WILL OF THE VICTIM, DETAINED OR 
SEIZED KRISTY LAMB, AND WHILE COMMITTING, ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT, 
OR IN THE IMMEDIATE FLIGHT AFTER THE ATTEMPT OR COMMISSION OF THE 
KIDNAPPING, DID POSSESS, USE, OR THREATEN THE USE OF A DANGEROUS 
WEAPON, TO WIT, A FIREARM. 
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COUNT V 
INTERRUPTING A COMMUNICATION DEVICE, A CLASS "B" MISDEMEANOR, AT: 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 2 6, 2000, IN VIOLATION OF 
SECTION 76-6-108, UCA (1953, AS AMENDED), TO WIT, THAT ON OR 
ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO PROHIBIT OR 
INTERRUPT OR DID PROHIBIT OR INTERRUPT, ANOTHER PERSON'S USE OF 
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT WHEN THE OTHER PERSON WAS ATTEMPTING TO 
SUMMON EMERGENCY AID OR WHEN THE OTHER PERSON HAD COMMUNICATED A 
DESIRE TO SUMMON EMERGENCY AID, AND IN THE PROCESS, THE DEFENDANT 
USED FORCE, INTIMIDATION, OR ANOTHER FORM OF VIOLENCE, OR 
DESTROYED, DISABLED, OR DAMAGED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, OR 
COMMITTED ANY OTHER ACT IN AN ATTEMPT TO PROHIBIT OR INTERRUPT 
THE PERSON'S USE OF A COMMUNICATION DEVICE TO SUMMON EMERGENCY 
AID. 
NOTICE OF ENHANCEMENT 
Pursuant to section 76-3-203, UCA (1953, as amended), the 
sentence of the defendant, upon a conviction, is subject to 
enhancement due to the use of a dangerous weapon. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: Randy Higley, Mark Rowley, Troy Pilivi, 
Roger Olsen, Cordell Thompson, Brett Ricketts, Je/remy Rose, 
Kristy Lamb, Duong Lee, Abel Carrazco, Timothy B^rela, and Salina 
Guajardo. 
DATED December 4, 2000. 
ROGER M /BARON 
foSECUTCTG ATTORNEY 
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ADDENDUM 5 
Dale M. Dorius #0903 
Justin C. Bond #8047 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 89^ " 
29 Soul. Main 
BrigL. City. Utah 84302 
(801)7. 3-5219 Phone 
(801) 723-5210 Fax 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs 
NOE C. .RRENO 
Plaintiff ; 
Defendant ] 
) MOTION AND MEMORANDUM 
TO APPOrNT INVESTIGATOR 
Case No. 001100703 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel, and hereby moves the Court for an 
Order granting the funds necessary to appoint an investigator in the above action. This motion is 
supported by the facts and Memorandum below. 
FACTS 
The Defense deems it necessary to have an Box Elder County funds necessary to 'lploy a 
priva' 'vest'^ator to explore possible defenses, specifically self defense. 
There is evidence supplied to counsel that the two alleged victims in this action were 
presumed to be dangerous at the time of the alleged crime. The two alleged victims were 
involved in gangs and had threatend Defendant at knife point prior to this incident. 
To make Defendant rely on cross examination to develop this testimony would be unfair 
j'\l* 
and violate Defendant's due process and right to a fair trial. 
Without the appointment of an investigator the Court is seriously limiting the Defendant's 
right to a fair trial in this matter. The State has vast resources to investigate, and the Defendant is 
seriously disadvantaged in light of those resources. 
MEMORANDUM 
Utah Code Annotated §77-32-301 provides minimum standards for defense of an indigent. 
§77-J- .01 states 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in criminal 
cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in accordance 
with the following minimum standards: 
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial probability 
of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty; 
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense; 
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; 
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right. . . 
In Jackson v. State, 624 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 1981) the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled 
Our determination of this issue is reinforced by a consideration of the 
Congressional purpose in enacting U.S.C. 3006A(e) and the due process 
requirement of fair administration of justice, guaranteeing the crucial right of an 
indigent to reasonably fair equality with those who had adequate financial means to 
protect their rights. If the fairness of our system is to be assured, indigent 
defendants must have access to minimal defense aids to offset the advantage 
presented by the vast prosecutorial and investigative resources available to the 
Government. A contrary position might weU result in a system wherein the 
outcome of criminal trials would be determined by the poverty of the accused 
irither than the integrity of the fact finding process. . . 
Due process cannot be satisfied unless the defendant is provided some opportunity 
to examine possible exculpatory evidence long enough before trial so as to have a 
least an opportunity to determine if such evidence is or is not exculpatory. . . 
" he trial judge should tend to rely on the judgment of the attorney, who has the 
imary duty of providing an adequate defense. . .(I)t comes close to putting the 
nJigent defendant in the same position as a non-indigent defendant, where the 
defense attorney would determine whether to engage the service. 
A complete defense means the Defendant has access to resources to conduct and 
investigation and discover favorable or exculpatory evidence. Simply to rely on the evidence 
obtained from the State and not allow the Defendant to conduct independent investigation is 
patently unfair. 
As the Court indicated in Jackson, the outcome of criminal trials would be determined by 
poveri> tf the accused rather than integrity of the fact finding process. Due process cannot be 
satisfied unless the defendant is provided some opportunity to examine possible exculpatory 
evidence. In the present case, the Defendant believes there is exculpatory evidence and request 
the opportunity to examine it. The Court should rely on the judgment of the attorney who has the 
responsibility of providing the defense. 
If the Court refuses to appoint an investigator, paid for by County funds, the Court puts 
itself in the position it is dictating the evidence and facts Defendant will be allowed to present a 
trial. 
THEREFORE, Defendant requests the Court grant an Order allowing Defendant a 
private investigator to be paid for by the County of Box Elder. 
DATED this _ / £ day of January, 2001. 
^O 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Jon J. Bunderson 
County Attorney 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
DATED this fe_ day of January, 2001. 
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ADDENDUM 6 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NOE CARRENO, 
Defendant. 
HON. BEN H. HADFIELD 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 001100703 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the defendant's Motion and Memorandum 
to Appoint Investigator and also the defendant's Motion to Continue Jury Trial. The Court has read 
each of said Motions. The Motion to Appoint Investigator was filed January I6tl] at 4:00 p.m. The 
Motion to Continue Jury Trial was filed January 22nd at 2:30 in the afternoon. 
The Court has reviewed the Motion and Memorandum to Appoint an Investigator and finds 
the arguments advanced by counsel unpersuasive. No specific issues are raised which would require 
the assistance of an investigator. The bald assertion, "there is evidence supplied to counsel that the two 
alleged victims were presumed to be dangerous," does not rise to the level compelling the appointment 
of an investigator. Defense counsel can work with the defendant and subpoena whatever witnesses the 
defense deems necessary. 
The Court takes issue with a concluding sentence in the defendant's Memorandum wherein 
the defendant alleges, 
"If the Court refuses to appoint an investigator, paid for by county funds, the 
Court puts itself in the position it is dictating the evidence and facts defendant 
will be allowed to present at trial." 
That assertion is false. The Court is dictating when and how the trial will proceed, nothing more. 
The record very clearly reflects that on December 14th, following the preliminary hearing, 
various trial dates were discussed. The dates of February 6, 7 and 8lh were agreed upon. Mr. Justin 
Bond representing the defendant, the defendant himself, and Roger Baron representing the State, were 
present. A final pretrial was scheduled for January 29th at 1:30 p.m. Further, all counsel were advised 
at that time that all motions must be filed by January 5, 2001, 5:00 p.m. Witness lists were to be 
exchanged prior to the January 29th hearing. 
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The defendant's Motion to Appoint Investigator was filed late in the day January 16lh, 
eleven full days after the deadline mandated by the Court. Defense counsel makes no attempt 
whatsoever to explain his reason for failing to meet the Court-mandated deadline. There is certainly 
nothing in the Memorandum filed by the defendant to suggest that the information was not available 
on December 14, 2000. The Court is denying the Motion to Appoint Investigator on the merits. 
However, defense counsel is also admonished that the deadlines set by the Court mean exactly what 
they say. The trial dates of February 6, 7 and 8lh are confirmed. 
DATED this X^ day of January, 2001. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 001100703 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JUSTIN C BOND 
ATTORNEY DEF 
P 0 BOX 8 95 
2 9 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 843 02 
Mail JON J. BUNDERSON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
45 NORTH 1ST EAST 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 843 02 
Dated this <?J-\ day of \\h.n 20 /? / . 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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ADDENDUM 7 
BRlCHAU 0!STRICT 
DaleM Dorius #0903 
JustinC Bond #8047 FEB U 4 15 f'il '01 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 895 
29 South Main 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
(801) 723-5219 Phone 
(801) 723-5210 Fax 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) EXPATRE SUPPLEMENT TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
) MEMORANDUM 
TO APPOINT INVESTIGATOR 
Plaintiff ) 
Case No. 001100703 
vs ) 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
NOE CARRENO ) 
Defendant ) 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel, and hereby moves the Court for an 
Order granting the funds necessary to appoint an investigator in the above action. This motion is 
supported by the facts and Memorandum below. 
FACTS 
The Defense deems it necessary to have an Box Elder County funds necessary lo employ a 
private investigator to develop a defense based on the following facts made known to defense 
counsel. 
1. For the purposes of this supplemental motion, Defendant cites the police reports of this 
incident. There are three different stories of what occurred on November 27, 2000 in Tremonton 
Utah. 
a. Kristy Lamb relates in a written statement to the police she had two friends over 
at her house, Lee Duong and Abel Carrazco. Defendant called about 11:30. Kristy hung up on 
him. About 12:30 Defendant knocked on the door. Kristy did not open the door. Defendant 
kicked in the door. Kristy told Defendant she was going to call the cops. She dialed 911. 
Defendant then pulled the phone out. Defendant then grabbed her by the shirt and tried to pull 
her outside. Kristy saw Defendant had a gun in his hand. He was pointing it at Lee. She can't 
remember what was said but they got over by the arm of the couch and then she heard a gun shot 
right by her ear. Lee Duong ran outside (or went out the window). Defendant tried to get Kristy 
to go with him again. Defendant then ran after Lee again and tried to fight him. Kristy saw a 
neighbor and told him to call the cops. Defendant then got in his van and drove away. In other 
police reports, it indicates Kristy stated two shots were fired that night. 
The following is the report Kristy Lamb gave to Detective Rowley. Defendant had 
telephoned her several times prior to this incident. Ms. Lamb stated that she and Defendant are 
married however, they are separated. Ms. Lamb stated that Defendant wanted to get back 
together with her. She told Defendant she did not want to get back together. Ms Lamb stated 
she had Mr. Duong and his cousin Abel Carrazco over at her apartment. Ms. Lamb stated that 
someone began pounding on the front door of the apartment. Ms Lamb checked to see who it 
was through the security hole. Ms Lamb stated that was Defendant. Ms. Lamb stated that 
Defendant began kicking the door and entered the residence. She told Defendant she was going 
to call the police. Ms. Lamb started to dial 911, and Defendant grabbed the phone and pulled the 
cord from the wall. Defendant grabbed Ms Lamb by the shirt and started to pull her toward the 
door. Ms. Lamb saw Defendant had a gun and he was pointing it at Mr. Duong. Ms. Lamb stated 
that the three of them ended up by the couch and they were struggling. Ms. Lamb heard the gun 
go offbe her ear. Mr. Duong ran out of the apartment and Defendant tried again to get Ms. 
Lamb to go with him. Defendant ran out of the apartment. Ms. Lamb saw Mr. Duong running 
back toward the apartment. Mr. Duong fell down just outside the apartment. Ms. Lamb was 
helping Mr. Duong get up when Defendant came back to the apartment. Mr. Duong ran to the 
rear of the apartment where he exited through one of the windows. 
At the preliminary hearing, Kristy Lamb testified the gun "went off."0 
b. Abel Carrazco states "Defendant started kicking the door till he broke the door 
and then he started fighting with my cousin Lee and that's when I started to the back room and 1 
got out the window so I wouldn't get shot. He left then I saw him like five minutes later 1 asked 
if he was okay then 1 saw his arm it was bloode so we came to the hospital." 
c. Lee Duong related the following facts to the police. Mr Duong stated that Mr. 
Carreno was knocking on the front door but Ms. Lamb would not answer it. Mr. Duong stated 
that Defendant started kicking the door. It was kicked six or seven times before it opened. Mr. 
Duong stated his cousin ran to the back of the apartment. Defendant showed Mr. Duong the gun 
that he was carrying. Mr. Duong stated that Defendant had the gun in his pocket. Mr. Duong 
stated that Defendant was holding the gun with his right hand. When Mr. Duong saw the gun he 
hit Defendant in the face with his fist. Mr. Duong attempted to hit Defendant again. Defendant 
shot Mr. Duong before he could hit him. Dr. Duong stated Defendant shot him at point blank 
range. Ms. Lamb was in between Mr. Duong and Defendant at the time of the shot. Mr. Duong 
ran outside of the apartment and began knocking on the door to get some help. Mr. Duong stated 
Mr. Carreno was running after him. Mr. Duong ran back toward the apartment. Mr. Duong 
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tripped and fell twice as he tried to get back to the apartment Mr Duong states Defendant fired 
another shot. Mr Duong ran back to the apartment and climbed out the back window 
At the preliminary hearing, Lee Duong testified that Defendant kicked in the door. He 
tried to put his shoes on. His first reaction was to hit Defendant. There was a struggle and the 
gun went off. 
d According to the police reports, Defendant related the following facts Defendant 
related that he got the handgun from his brother but that the gun earlier had belonged to his father 
in law. He took the gun when given to him by his brother as protection from his wife's boyfriend 
should there be problems again like there had been about two weeks ago. 
In an earlier incident on October 30, 2000, the following facts are stated by Deputy Lewis. 
At 1900 hours I arrived at the 830 North Stone Road, Snowville. Trooper Willmore had 
one female, Kristy Carreno, and two males, Lee Duong and Gegorio Santos, stopped that had just 
come from the complainant's residence. The officer went to Noe Carreno's residence and Noe 
related the following facts to the officer. Noe and his wife have 3 children and Kristy came out to 
Snowville to give them to Noe and turn over her parental rights to Noe. Kristy had two other 
guys with her, Lee Duong and Gregorio Santos. They were in the home when Kristy asked for 
money. Noe said he did not have any. Gegorio stood up and went to the sink and got a 12" 
knife, went over and said your wife wants money, give it to her. Gregorio held the knife down to 
his side and said again give her the money. Noe got scared and went to the bathroom down the 
hall When he felt safe, he came out and snuck our the back door. 
Noe did not have a phone and did not know what to do. Noe stated he wanted to call the 
police but could not so he stabbed the tires on his car so they could not leave 
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The police discovered a 12" knife at Noe's residence 
After this incident, Defendant filed a protective order against Kristy Lamb filed by Noe 
Carreno, signed by Judge Ben H. Hadfield on November 13, 2000. The protective order prohibits 
Kristy Lamb from contacting the children or Defendant in anyway. 
MEMORANDUM 
There is evidence supplied to counsel that the two alleged victims in this action were 
presumed to be dangerous at the time of the alleged crime. The two alleged victims were 
involved in gangs and had threatened Defendant at knife point prior to this incident. 
Defendant went to his wife's residence to talk to her since he was now entirely supporting 
the children and his wife was running around with different men. 
Defendant went over to the residence with a gun. The Defense wants to establish that 
Defendant did not go over with the intent to shoot anyone but merely had the gun for protection. 
The protection was needed because of the earlier incident stated above, that Lee Duong and 
another had threatened Defendant with a knife. The protection was further needed based on the 
possibility Lee Duong and Kristy were involved in gangs and drugs. 
If that is proven, the shooting was merely an accident or possible a lesser included offense 
of the charged crime because Defendant did not intend to shoot anyone. This is based on the fact 
that both Kristy and Lee state the gun went off during a struggle,. 
An investigator is needed to determine the events of October 30, 2000 to show the jury 
Defendant had reason to need protection when he went to his wife's residence. No crimes were 
filed relating to that incident and there are very few reports. An investigator can find any possible 
police reports relating to that incident, interview the police officers, interview others that were 
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there at the time 
An investigator can find out who Lee Duong, Gegorio Santos, and Abel Carrazco are and 
whether they are involved in drugs, gangs etc . Regarding Lee Duong, this is important in 
discrediting his testimony at trial. The stories given by Lee Duong and Kristy Lamb are different 
and that difference is important in the trial of this matter. The difference is when the gun was 
pulled, whether Defendant pointed the gun at Lee Duong, when exactly the stmggle began. For 
instance, Kristy states she had time to get the phone and dial 911. Lee Duong states that 
immediately upon entering, he hit Defendant and the struggle started. 
Further, Kristy Lamb states Defendant pulled the phone from the wall. Defendant states 
the phone was in her hand during the struggle and was pulled out at that point. 
The Defense needs an investigator to examine the length of the phone cord and where the 
struggle took place This would help to discredit Kristy Lamb's story about Defendant pulling the 
cord from the wall. 
Defense counsel simply does not have the time or resources necessary to conduct said I 
investigation. Further, Defense counsel cannot testify at the trial of any incidents learned during I 
said investigation. 
One consistent fact in the incident of November 27 is that the gun went off during a f 
struggle. There is no evidence that Defendant intentionally fired the gun at the two alleged V 
victims. This negates the crime of attempted homicide. 
The scene of this matter needs to be examined by an investigator with experience in these 
matters. One such fact is that there was not a second shell casing found at the scene. There was 
one shell casing found inside the residence. However, there are statements that a second shot was 
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fired. Two empty shell casing were found in the van. It is not evident whether these were fired at 
the scene or not 
Investigators are experts in the investigation of crimes and one is needed to determine the 
likelihood of whether that second shot was fired at the scene. Further, there were others beyond 
the victims and Defendant near this scene. An investigator can determine who those persons were 
and what they saw or heard. 
It is simply not appointed counsel's expertise or duty to conduct these investigations. Nor 
does appointed counsel have the time to devote full and adequate investigation necessary for a 
complete defense in this action. Defense counsel cannot set aside all other cases to perform the 
necessary investigation in this action. Investigators perform just that function. The investigator is 
necessary because of the time they can devote to this case and their expertise in these matters. 
To make Defendant rely on cross examination to develop this testimony would be unfair 
and violate Defendant's due process and right to a fair trial. 
Without the appointment of an investigator the Court is seriously limiting the Defendant's 
right to a fair trial in this matter. The State has vast resources to investigate, and the Defendant is 
seriously disadvantaged in light of those resources. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-32-301 provides minimum standards for defense of an indigent. 
§77-32-301 states 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in criminal 
cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in accordance 
with the following minimum standards. 
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial probability 
of the deprivation of the indigent's liberty; 
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(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel, 
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense; 
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; 
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right. . . 
In Jackson v State. 624 P 2d 751 (Wyo. 1981) the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled 
Our determination of this issue is reinforced by a consideration of the 
Congressional purpose in enacting U.S.C. 3006A(e) and the due process 
requirement of fair administration of justice, guaranteeing the crucial right of an 
indigent to reasonably fair equality with those who had adequate financial means to 
protect their rights. If the fairness of our system is to be assured, indigent 
defendants must have access to minimal defense aids to offset the advantage 
presented by the vast prosecutorial and investigative resources available to the 
Government. A contrary position might well result in a system wherein the 
outcome of criminal trials would be determined by the poverty of the accused 
rather than the integrity of the fact finding process. . . 
Due process cannot be satisfied unless the defendant is provided some opportunity 
to examine possible exculpatory evidence long enough before trial so as to have a 
least an opportunity to determine if such evidence is or is not exculpatory. . . 
The trial judge should tend to rely on the judgment of the attorney, who has the 
primary duty of providing an adequate defense. .(I)t comes close to putting the 
indigent defendant in the same position as a non-indigent defendant, where the 
defense attorney would determine whether to engage the service. 
A complete defense means the Defendant has access to resources to conduct and 
investigation and discover favorable or exculpatory evidence. Simply to rely on the evidence 
obtained from the State and not allow the Defendant to conduct independent investigation is 
patently unfair. 
As the Court indicated in Jackson, the outcome of criminal trials would be determined by 
poverty of the accused rather than integrity of the fact finding process. Due process cannot be 
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satisfied unless the defendant is provided some opportunity to examine possible exculpatory 
evidence. In the present case, the Defendant believes there is exculpatory evidence and request 
the opportunity to examine it. The Court should rely on the judgment of the attorney who has the 
responsibility of providing the defense. 
If the Court refuses to appoint an investigator, paid for by County funds, the Court puts 
itself in the position it is dictating the evidence and facts Defendant will be allowed to present a 
trial. The reason the Court put itself in that position is because Defense counsel cannot testily at 
trial if any evidence is discovered such as the victims involvement in gangs or drugs or any other 
matters. Further, Defense counsel cannot take the stand and testify to things such as how long a 
phone cord is, where the struggle took place, the layout of the apartment, whether the gun casing 
was ejected in the van, etc. 
Finally, Defense counsel feels it is unfair to require this much evidence to attempt get an 
investigator appointed in a First Degree attempted murder charge. Most of the statements related 
this action are attorney work product, and Defense counsel should not have to reveal it to the 
prosecution. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests the Court grant an Order allowing Defendant a 
private investigator to be paid for by the County of Box Elder. 
DATED this tf day of February, 2001. . 
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ADDENDUM 8 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^O 
You are instructed that a defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and 
has the right to go upon the witness stand and testify if he chooses to do so. However, the 
law expressly provides that no presumption adverse to him is to arise from the mere fact 
that he does not place himself upon the witness stand. If he is satisfied with the evidence 
which has been given, there is no reason for him to add thereto. 
In deciding whether or not to testify, a defendant may choose to rely on the state of 
the evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the State to prove every element of the charge 
against him, and no lack of testimony on defendant's part will supply a failure of proof by 
the State so as to support by itself a finding against a defendant on any such element. 
So, in this case, the mere fact that the defendant has not availed himself of the 
privilege which the law gives him should not prejudice him in any way. It should not be 
considered as any indication either of his guilt or innocence. The failure of a defendant to 
testify is not even a circumstance against him and no presumption of guilt can be indulged 
in the minds of the jury by reason of such a decision on his part. 
ADDENDUM 9 
INSTRUCTION NO. ffi 
The Court instructs the Jury that although the verdict to which each Juror agrees 
must, of course, be each Juror's own conclusion, and not a mere acquiescence in the 
conclusion of fellow Jurors yet, in order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result the 
jurors should examine with candor the questions submitted to them, with due regard and 
deference to the opinions of each other. A dissenting Juror should consider whether their 
state of mind is a reasonable one, when it makes no impression on the minds of so many 
Jurors equally honest, equally intelligent, who have heard the same evidence, with an 
equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the sanction of the same oath. You are not to give 
up a conscientious conclusion after you have reached such a conclusion finally, but it is 
your duty to confer with your fellow Jurors carefully and earnestly, and with a desire to do 
absolute justice both to the State and to the defendant. 
ADDENDUM 10 
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THE COURT: Mr. Bond. 
MR. BOND: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Good morning. I'm going to be really brief. Mr. Baron 
has given a complete overview of the evidence, but you'll 
hear the evidence when it's presented by the witnesses and I 
think that's the better way to hear it so — but let me 
indicate a couple of things that I -- that I think 
Mr. Baron's confused about. 
Number one, they're not divorced. They're — they're 
still wife and husband. And I think that's important. I 
think — I think Mr. Baron is trying to show that it's his 
ex-wife and she's with some other man and he's up -- he's 
upset about all this, but there's a lot more to it than that. 
So I think you got to pay attention to that. 
And, also, there's one thing about — I -- I think in 
this case you have to focus on the evidence about when 
Mr. Carreno comes into the house and where the gun was and 
whether he pointed it at anybody and how the gun actually 
went off because the evidence will show that -- that there 
was a struggle. As — as Mr. Baron indicated, the one 
person, Mr. Duong, hit him in the face. 
And then — and then you'll hear testimony that there 
was a struggle at the couch. And the evidence will show that 
he did not point this gun at anybody, that he -- that it 
wasn't his — that wasn't his purpose, to go in there and 
58 
shoot somebody. 
I mean -- now, the State made it sound like he went in 
there with the gun drawn and started shooting the gun at 
somebody, but that's not what happened. And I think you have 
to pay attention to that because everything that they're 
charging comes down to that point, why he went in there, what 
his purpose was. 
And if you look at — the judge read the counts to you 
and all that stuff and they all go together, that the 
burglary goes in line with — with the intent used for the 
aggravated murder (sic). If he went in there with a gun 
drawn to shoot somebody, then there's an aggravated murder 
(sic) here. But if — if he didn't, if the gun went off and 
it was an accident, you can't convict him of that and that's 
what's important. And I think as you go through this trial 
you ought to focus on the statements of those witnesses and 
how that gun actually went off. 
And — and there's another issue about why Mr. Carreno 
had that gun. I know that's going to be a question you're 
going to have. And the evidence will show that — that 
they -- that the defendant and his wife had been having some 
problems for some time. They have a few children together — 
I'm not sure how many, I think three. And they were having 
problems in their marriage and she was with some other men 
and she kept — and I — and I think the evidence will show 
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there were drugs involved and -- and things like that. 
And she called him up that day and she wanted to come 
home. She wanted to get back together as a family. And the 
evidence will show that he had had an incident with these 
same people before where they had threatened to take some 
money for him — from him, and he was afraid of these people 
and he took that gun over there to protect himself. And all 
that goes in line with — with the intent of why he's over 
there and whether or not there was an actual aggravated 
murder (sic) that was committed. And that's — that's the 
important things I think you should focus on. 
But based on that, that's all I have for right now. 
Thanks. 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the 
information is the document that contains the formal charges. 
I've read those to you. The defendant has pled not guilty as 
to each of those charges. 
We'll now proceed with the evidence. 
Mr. Baron, you may call your first witness. 
MR. BARON: Thank you. We would call Lee Duong to 
the stand. 
LEE DUONG, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
~k -k -k -k ~k 
ADDENDUM 11 
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Now, there's the idea -- the one idea that's kind of 
troubling is why is the gun there. Now, if you'll recall, 
Mr. Carreno told Officer Rowley that he took it there in 
self-defense, that he was frightened. And if you read this 
statement that was entered into evidence, you'll see what 
happened on the 30th. And I suggest you read this and think 
about these people that he went over (sic). 
You remember he had called his wife and talked about --
talked to her about it. They had talked earlier in the day. 
He goes over there -- and you've got to read this statement 
and understand what he knew about these two people and why he 
was afraid of them and why he felt it necessary to carry a 
gun with him. 
I mean, I -- I don't think there's anybody here that 
would doubt that that -- it's not a good idea to go carrying 
guns around. That doesn't mean you're guilty of first degree 
felonies. But you -- you have to read this statement and 
understand what -- what's going on there. 
And I suggest you read this. I know you didn't hear 
testimony about it, but it's been entered into evidence 
and -- and there's a lot in there about -- I think about why 
he took that gun m there and it goes a lot to his state of 
mind. It goes a lot to that specific intent again. 
Now, you know, the State recited a lot of evidence as 
they went through the instructions, but they never did get to 
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that point of the specific intent. They always said -- they 
always read something and said here's the proof, but they 
never told you about how they showed you that it was his 
intent to go in there and do this. You have to consider all 
of this, that every element in here has to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
They -- they indicated that breaking the door is a 
threat, a — a threat that would support the assault. I 
don't know how they get to that point. How do you -- how is 
kicking the door down an assault, a threat of force to do 
bodily injury to somebody? That — that doesn't even work. 
I don't know where he got that from, but you have to be 
careful about statements like that. 
The testimony about Kristy that he — he waved the gun 
over her and — and it — you have to remember, the State 
also said -- what did they say? That he pointed it at 
several people. Was -- did you hear anything in this trial 
that he pointed that gun at several people? Again, that's 
trying to influence you into filling a gap that they can't do 
on the evidence itself. 
He said waving the gun around and pointing it at 
different people. There was no testimony of that. And you 
have to be careful about that kind of stuff. It's just 
people trying to sell you ideas that they can't — that 
weren't in the evidence. 
